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Abstract 
Brassard, G., C. Crepeau and M. Yung, Constant-round perfect zero-knowledge computationally 
convincing protocols, Theoretical Computer Science 84 (1991) 23-52. 
A perfect zero-knowledge interactive protocol allows a prover to convince a verifier of the validity 
of a statement in a way that does not give the verifier any additional information. Such protocols 
take place by the exchange of messages back and forth between the prover and the verifier. An 
important measure of efficiency for these protocols is the number of rounds in the interaction. In 
previously known perfect zero-knowledge protocols for statements concerning NP-complete 
problems, at least k rounds were necessary in order to prevent one party from having a probability 
of undetected cheating greater than 2-k. In this paper, we give the first perfect zero-knowledge 
protocol that offers arbitrarily high security for any statement in NP with a constant number of 
rounds. The protocol is computationally convincing (rather than statistically convincing as would 
have been an interactive proof-system in the sense of Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff) because 
the verifier’s belief in the prover’s claim is partly based on the assumption that it is feasible to 
find a prime p with known factorization of p - 1 such that it is infeasible to compute discrete 
logarithms modulo p even for someone who knows the factors of p - 1. Our protocol can also be 
based on the more general assumption that one-way certzjied group actions exist. It is still open 
whether it would be sufficient to assume the existence of one-way functions in order to obtain 
perfect zero-knowledge computationally convincing interactive protocols for all statements in NP. 
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1. Introduction 
Much excitement was caused when it was discovered in 1986 by Goldreich, Micali 
and Wigderson that all statements in NP have computational zero-knowledge interac- 
tive proof-systems (under the assumption that secure encryption functions exist) 
[25]. See also [lo]. Such proof-systems, a notion formalized by Goldwasser, Micali 
and Rackoff a few years previously, allow an infinitely powerful (but not trusted) 
prover to convince a probabilistic polynomial-time verifier of the validity of a 
statement in a way that does not convey any polynomial-time-usable knowledge to 
the verifier, other than the validity of the statement [26]. Informally, this means 
that the verifier should not be able to generate anything useful in probabilistic 
polynomial time after having participated in the protocol that he could not have 
generated by himself without ever talking to the prover (from mere belief that the 
statement is true). We say of such proof-systems that they are statistically convincing 
because the verifier is convinced by overwhelming statistical evidence: no matter 
how she’ proceeds, the prover is almost certain to be caught cheating if she tries 
to convince the verifier of a false statement. A more precise definition (not needed 
for this paper) can be found in [26]. 
A result similar to those of [25, lo] was obtained by Chaum, but under a very 
different model, which emphasizes the unconditional privacy of the prover’s secret 
information, even if the verifier has unlimited computing power [ 161. Independently, 
Brassard and Crepeau considered a model (compatible with Chaum’s) in which all 
parties involved are assumed to have reasonable computing power, and they also 
obtained a protocol unconditionally secure for the prover (meaning that the prover’s 
safety did not depend on unproved cryptographic assumptions) [ 111. On the other 
hand, these protocols are not statistically convincing (hence they are not proof- 
systems in the terminology of [26]) because the prover could cheat without fear of 
detection if she had unlimited computing power or, more importantly in practice, 
if she could break an unproved cryptographic assumption in real time. For this 
reason, we say of these protocols that they are computationally convincing [8]. (Such 
protocols have also been termed arguments [12] in order to distinguish them from 
proof-systems; Goldreich has proposed calling them computationally sound proofs; 
we follow here a terminology recently proposed by Chaum.) 
The difference between these results is important because all the information on 
the prover’s secret is given to the verifier in the protocols of [25, lo], albeit in 
enciphered form. Hence, the verifier can have access to the prover’s secret informa- 
’ It is convenient to give distinct and definite genders to the participants of our protocols. The prover 
will be referred to as a “she” (think of P as Peggy) and the verifier will be referred to as a “he” 
(V as Vie). Other actors to be introduced later are the simulator (Section 5.2), referred to as an “it”, 
and the originator and the receiver in bit commitment schemes (Section 3). The case of the latter two 
is more complex because the originator’s role is usually played by the prover but sometimes by the 
verifier. Out of context, the originator will be a “she” and the receiver will be a “he”, but this will switch 
when the originator is definitely the verifier. 
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tion, provided he can break the cryptographic assumption-perhaps by luck-or if 
he is willing to undergo an infeasible computation. Such attacks from the verifier 
can even be performed o&line, i.e. any time after the protocol has been completed. 
In contrast, no information at all (even in the sense of Shannon’s information theory 
[32]) is given to the verifier in the protocols of [ 16, 111, except with an exponentially 
small probability. This exponentially small probability of cheating for the verifier 
was subsequently removed by Brassard, Chaum and Crepeau [9], thanks to an idea 
of Damgard [17] (and independently of Boyar, Krentel and Kurtz [7]), yielding in 
effect a perfect zero-knowledge protocol in the terminology of [25]. This implies 
that the prover’s safety would still be guaranteed indefinitely, even if strong organiz- 
ations with unknown computing power and algorithmic knowledge were to try to 
extract her secret. Thus, the crucial difference between computational and perfect 
zero-knowledge is that in the former case the verifier may obtain information on 
the prover’s secret through the interaction, but he cannot make use of it in polynomial 
time (unless the cryptographic assumption fails), whereas in the latter case, the 
verifier obtains no information whatsoever on the prover’s secret (beyond its 
existence and the fact that the prover knows it). To summarize, [25, lo] give 
computational zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocols, 
whereas [9] gives a perfect zero-knowledge computationally convincing interactive 
protocol. 
What about the best of both worlds? Unfortunately, Fortnow proved that it is 
unlikely that there is a free lunch [22]: the prover’s increased safety in [16, 11,9] 
inevitably requires that an infinitely powerful prover (in fact, exponentially powerful 
would suffice) could cheat the verifier (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses). 
This is why a perfect zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocol is 
unlikely to exist for NP-complete problems, even under a reasonable cryptographic 
assumption. 
The main motivation behind the work of [25, 10, 16, 11,9] was a quest for general- 
ity: what are the most general statements that can be handled by (perfect) zero- 
knowledge interactive protocols if little attention is paid to efficiency? Other research- 
ers were willing to sacrifice generality on the altar of efficiency. The best known 
instance of this approach is Feige, Fiat and Shamir’s identification system (FFS) 
[20], which handles an ad hoc problem relevant to the purpose of identification, 
but was not designed to handle statements about NP-complete problems. One reason 
why the FFS scheme is so attractive in practice is that it requires only a few rounds 
of communication between the prover and the verifier. A constant-round perfect 
zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocol was also known for the 
specific problem of graph nonisomorphism, due to Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson 
[25]. In sharp contrast, the more general protocols of [25, 10, 16, 11, 93 require an 
arbitrarily high number of rounds in order to achieve an arbitrarily high level of 
confidence. This paper addresses the following question: Is it possible to combine 
generality and arbitrarily high confidence with a constant number of rounds? 
Provided that one-way certified group actions [ 151 exist (see Section 9), our answer 
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is that any NP statement can be handled by a three-round perfect zero-knowledge 
computationally convincing interactive protocol. (By one “round”, we mean two 
“moves”: one message sent by the verifier followed by one message sent by the 
prover.) 
Similar questions have been investigated by other researchers. Goldreich and 
Kahn [23], and independently Naor and Yung [30] have developed constant-round 
computational zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocols for all 
NP statements. In contrast, we describe here the first constant-round perfect zero- 
knowledge interactive protocol, which is of course merely computationally convinc- 
ing. Our work was first presented at the 16th International Colloquium on Automata, 
Languages and Programming (ICALP), held in July 1989 [14]. Shortly thereafter, 
Feige and Shamir introduced an entirely different solution to the same problem at 
the CRYPT0 ‘89 conference, held in August 1989 [21]. Most of Feige and Shamir’s 
work deals with a computationally convincing interactive protocol that is merely 
computational zero-knowledge under the very weak assumption that one-way func- 
tions exist, but they also show how to make it perfect zero-knowledge under a 
stronger assumption essentially identical to the one we need here. 
Further developments are also worth mentioning. After reading our ICALP paper 
[14], Bellare, Micali and Ostrovsky discovered a beautiful constant-round perfect 
zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocol for graph isomorphism 
and, more generally, for any random self-reducible problem [2]. Their protocol 
does not depend on any unproved assumptions. They achieved this by building 
upon our technique, and adding several very clever ideas, in particular in the design 
of their simulator. Of course, because of Fortnow’s result, their protocol cannot be 
extended to NP-complete problems unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. 
2. Sequential versus parallel templates 
More precise definitions of what exactly is a perfect zero-knowledge computa- 
tionally convincing interactive protocol are given in Section 5, just before we describe 
our final protocol and prove that it is correct. In the mean time, we believe that it 
is preferable to keep the discussion at a more intuitive level. 
The protocols of [25, 10, 16, 11, 93 all follow the same basic template, which we 
shall refer to as the sequential approach. Very abstractly, it is illustrated as Protocol 1 
below. Here, k is a confidence parameter that must be agreed upon in advance 
between the prover and the verifier (perhaps during the initialization step). 
Protocol 1. (the sequential approach) 
1: perhaps some initialization 
2: foricltokdo 
the prover commits herself by sending x, to the verifier 
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the verifier sends challenge yi to the prover 
the prover meets the challenge by sending zi to the verifier. 
Each time round the loop, the prover places herself in a situation in which several 
challenges (two in [lo, 16, 11, 9,], many in [25]) could be issued by the verifier. 
This is done in a way that the prover can meet all of these challenges if and only 
if she is honest in her claim, but meeting any specific one of them yields worthless 
information to the verifier. Because the prover is required to meet only one challenge 
in each round, and because each round is independent from the others, the verifier 
learns nothing about her secret. Because the prover cannot predict ahead of time 
which challenge will be issued, the verifier’s confidence in the prover’s claim increases 
exponentially with the number of rounds. 
In order to reduce the number of rounds to a constant, Protocol 2 comes 
immediately to mind. We shall refer to it as the parallel approach. 
Protocol 2. (the parallel approach) 
1: perhaps some initialization 
2: the prover commits herself by sending x, , x2, . . . , xk to the verifier 
3: the verifier sends challenges y, , y,, . . . , yk to the prover 
4: the prover meets the challenges by sending zr , z2, . . . , zk to the verifier. 
It is easy to prove that the parallel approach cannot help the prover cheat. At 
first, it seems equally certain that if the verifier could not squeeze additional 
knowledge out of the sequential protocol, running the protocol in parallel cannot 
possibly help him to do so. However, nothing is certain in this world except death 
and taxes, and indeed this intuition is false (as pointed out in [25] in relation with 
their protocol for graph isomorphism). This is because the parallel approach makes 
it possible for the verifier to choose each challenge as a function of the entire set 
of prover’s commitments. This may seem harmless, but there are exponentially many 
possible challenge vectors. If this choice of challenges is made according to a 
one-way hash function, it makes it possible for the verifier to obtain information 
(the transcript of his conversation with the prover) that he could apparently not 
have obtained efficiently without access to the prover (or to someone in possession 
of her secret information). Goldreich and Krawczyk have indeed recently proved 
that the direct parallelization of the protocol for graph isomorphism [25] is not 
perfect zero-knowledge if the verifier is allowed to be nonuniform whereas the 
simulator (see Section 5.2) is restricted to being black box [24]. Whether this could 
in some cases help the verifier compute the prover’s secret is a most interesting open 
question. 
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3. Bit commitment schemes 
Central to our parallel protocol for any NP-statement is the notion of trap-door 
bit commitment scheme, which was first introduced in [9] under the more 
poetic name of chameleon blobs. The phrase “trap-door bit commitment scheme” 
was coined by Shamir [21] after reading [9]. We prefer it because it is more 
self-explanatory. 
The purpose of a bit commitment scheme (not necessarily trap-door) is to allow 
one party, the originator, to commit to the value of a bit in a way that prevents the 
other party, the receiver, from learning it without the first party’s help, but also in 
a way that prevents the first party from changing its value. At any time after she 
has committed to a bit, the originator can show the receiver which bit she had 
committed to a process known as opening the bit commitment. Of course, she should 
not be able to cheat by “changing her mind”, i.e. showing the wrong bit. In most 
zero-knowledge interactive protocols, the originator is the prover, but we shall see 
that this is not necessarily so. 
Bit commitment schemes can be implemented in a great many ways [9]. When 
they are based on cryptography and computational complexity (rather than physical 
envelopes or quantum physics [4]), they are necessarily imperfect. This imperfection 
can happen in two very different ways. If it is impossible for the originator to change 
her commitments in the receiver’s back, then it can be at best infeasible (i.e. within 
a reasonable amount of time) for the receiver to determine the bits committed to 
without the originator’s help. Conversely, if it is impossible for the receiver to 
determine these bits, then it can be at best infeasible for the originator to change 
her mind about a bit she had committed to when (and if) she subsequently 
decides to open the commitment. All the known perfect zero-knowledge interac- 
tive protocols for statements about NP-complete problems are based 
on this second type of bit commitment scheme, and our new protocol is no 
exception. 
Let us illustrate this notion by reviewing the first bit commitment scheme that 
allowed for a perfect zero-knowledge computationally convincing interactive pro- 
tocol for all NP statements [9]. This scheme, which is central to our new constant- 
round protocol as well, was invented independently by Damgird [ 171 and by Boyar, 
Krentel and Kurtz [7]. In Section 9, we shall see that this scheme is a special case 
of the broad class of bit commitment schemes based on one-way certified group 
actions [ 151. 
Let us first review some elementary number theory [28]. If p is a prime number, 
let us denote by ZF the multiplicative group of nonzero integers modulo p, i.e. 
{1,2, . . . , p - l} under multiplication modulo p. Similarly, let us denote by Z,_, the 
additive group of integers modulo p - 1, i.e. (0, 1, . . . , p - 2) under addition modulo 
p- 1. Notice that Zz and Z,_, contain the same number of elements. For any 
integers a, b and c such that a $0 (mod p) and b-c (modp- l), we have by 
Fermat’s Theorem that ah _ a’ (mod p). Therefore, it makes sense to speak of 
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xi for x E Zz and iE Z,_,. An element (Y of ZF is called a generator of Zz if 
each element of Zz can be obtained as a power of (Y. Therefore, if CY is a generator, 
the function exp, :Z,_, + ZF defined by expu(i) = a’ establishes a one-one 
correspondence. 
In order to set up the bit commitment scheme, the originator and receiver initially 
agree on a large prime p for which they both know the factorization of p - 1 (finding 
large primes p with known factorization of p - 1 can be done efficiently in practice 
[29]). They also agree on a generator a of Z ,*. Thanks to their knowledge of the 
factors of p - 1, they can both verify with certainty that p is a prime and that (Y is 
a generator of Zc. Moreover, the density of generators is high enough that one can 
be found reasonably efficiently by random trial and error. Actually, the parameters 
p and (Y need not be changed each time a bit commitment scheme has to be set up. 
Rather, they could be in the public domain (together with the factorization of p - 1) 
after having been selected once and for all by an authority that does not need to 
be trusted. Given any i E Z,_, , it is easy to compute LY’ efficiently by a divide-and- 
conquer approach, but no efficient algorithm is known to invert this process (even 
if the factors of p - 1 are known, provided they are not too small [31]), an operation 
known as extracting the discrete logarithm. 
Once the parameters p and (Y have been agreed upon, the receiver chooses a 
random s E ZF and gives it to the originator. We assume the certified discrete logarithm 
assumption, namely that the originator is not capable of computing the discrete 
logarithm of s while the protocol is in progress (“certified” because the factors of 
p - 1 are known to all parties in order that (Y is a certified generator. Since this 
could make computing the discrete logarithm easier, this assumption is stronger 
than the usual discrete logarithm assumption [6]). 
In order to commit to bit x E (0, l}, the originator selects a random r E Z,_, and 
she computes b = czrsJ. She gives b to the receiver but she keeps r as her secret 
witness. For convenience, we shall refer to b as a blob. Subsequently, if the originator 
wishes to convince the receiver that b was a commitment to bit x (recall that this 
operation is known as opening the blob), she simply shows him the corresponding 
witness r. The receiver can then check that indeed b = arsX. 
Because the function exp, is a one-one correspondence, any element of ZF can 
be used by the originator as commitment to 0 just as well as to 1, depending only 
on which witness she knows. Moreover, all commitments give rise to blobs that are 
randomly and independently distributed according to the uniform distribution over 
Zz. Therefore, it is information-theoretically impossible for the receiver to distin- 
guish a commitment to 0 from a commitment to 1, regardless of his computing 
power. On the other hand, the originator is able to open a given blob both ways if 
and only if she knows (or can efficiently compute) the discrete logarithm of s, which 
we assumed to be infeasible for her. Therefore, it seems clear that the originator 
cannot cheat, as argued in [9], if indeed computing this discrete logarithm is 
infeasible for her. It came as a great surprise to us that this is not so and that this 
bit commitment scheme allows a cheating originator to get away with it in some 
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situations. We shall discuss this issue later when we address the problem of so-called 
EPR-blobs (see Section 4). 
Using this bit commitment scheme (with the prover as originator of all commit- 
ments), a protocol for satisfiability is given in [9]. This protocol is reviewed in 
Section 5.3. Assuming the certified discrete logarithm assumption, this is indeed a 
perfect zero-knowledge computationally convincing interactive protocol despite the 
weakness in the bit commitment scheme alluded to in the previous paragraph, but 
of course only if it is performed sequentially (as required in [9]). Nevertheless, even 
the parallel version of this protocol would be perfect zero-knowledge if only the 
verifier (in fact the simulator, to be technically exact, see Section 5.2) had the key 
to its trap-door, a notion that we now explain. 
A bit commitment scheme has the trap-door property if, in addition to the usual 
requirements of bit commitment schemes, there exists a secret, known as the key to 
the trap-door, that would allow the originator to cheat her commitments any time 
she wants if only she knew this key. More precisely, knowledge of this key would 
make it possible for her to offer fake “commitments” that she could subsequently 
“open” either way at her choice of the moment, and these fake commitments are 
information-theoretically indistinguishable from genuine ones. A moment’s thought 
suffices to see that the bit commitment scheme based on the certified discrete 
logarithm assumption is indeed trap-door, and that its key is the discrete logarithm 
of s. (You may think that we will never allow the originator of commitments to 
know this key, but in fact it is going to be just the opposite!) 
In other words, the computationally convincing interactive protocol of [9] 
remains perfect zero-knowledge even if run in parallel, provided that the verifier 
knows the discrete logarithm of s. But this requirement is apparently easy to 
fulfill because the verifier in the global protocol is the receiver of the bit 
commitment scheme, hence it is his prerogative to choose the parameter s. Instead 
of choosing it randomly in Zt , he could choose j at random in Z,_, and compute 
s=CYj. 
So are we done? Not quite because the prover would have no reason to trust the 
verifier to choose s in a way that he (the verifier) would know the key to the bit 
commitment scheme trap-door. The obvious way to solve this difficulty would be 
to require that the verifier convinces the prover that he knows the discrete logarithm 
of s in the initialization of Protocol 2. Naturally, this initialization would have to 
be achieved with a perfect zero-knowledge protocol (in which prover and verifier 
switch roles temporarily) since the discrete logarithm of s must remain hidden from 
the prover. Unfortunately, the protocols discovered several years ago for this task 
[18, 191 inherently require an unbounded number of rounds! As mentioned at the 
end of Section 1, inspired by a previous version of the current paper [14], Bellare, 
Micali and Ostrovsky have recently shown how to achieve constant-round perfect 
zero-knowledge statistically convincing interactive protocols for any random self- 
reducible problem, including the discrete logarithm [2]. Using their protocol as the 
initialization of Protocol 2 would indeed solve our problem. However, it would 
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result in a more complicated protocol, requiring more rounds. In particular, the 
simulator (see Sections 5.2 and 8.1) would be significantly harder to work out. 
Following the work of Bellare, Micali and Ostrovsky, Brassard has discovered a 
direct and simpler protocol for the problem considered in this paper [ 131. Neverthe- 
less, let us now proceed to describe our original protocol, without using subsequent 
ideas that were derived from it. 
Our final solution for a constant-round protocol is to use a trap-door bit commit- 
ment scheme such that the verifier cannot cheat if he knows the key for one reason, 
and such that he can not cheat either if he does not know the key, but for an entirely 
different reason. Let us now sketch this idea intuitively before describing the final 
protocol formally. 
4. Forcing the verifier to commit 
From now on, we assume that the trap-door bit commitment scheme based on 
the certified discrete logarithm assumption is used, as described in the previous 
section. All protocols start with the prover and verifier agreeing once and for all on 
a suitably large prime p with known factorization of p - 1, with a generator cx of 
Zs, and with the choice of some s E Zz by the verifier. However, we do not restrict 
the verifier in his way of choosing s. He can choose it randomly in Zz, he can 
choose its discrete logarithm at random and compute s from it, or he can follow 
any other (efficient) strategy. 
Once all the bit commitment scheme parameters are agreed upon, either party 
can act as originator for commitments (recall that the prover used to be the only 
originator). Notice that we have slightly departed from the formal description of 
the discrete logarithm bit commitment scheme since we had previously said that 
the receiver had to choose s, whereas now it is chosen by the verifier who can also 
take the role of the originator. Of course, such commitments are bogus if the 
originator is the verifier and if he has chosen s in a way that he knows its discrete 
logarithm. Allowing such bogus commitments may sound crazy, but in fact this is 
perhaps the most crucial idea in this paper. 
Why is it interesting for the verifier to originate bit commitments? As we have 
already discussed, the reason why Protocol 2 is not perfect zero-knowledge is that 
the verifier can choose his challenges y, , y,, . . . , y, as some complex function of 
%,X2,..., xk. This is no longer possible if the verifier is forced to select his challenges 
before seeing the xi’s. But of course, the prover must not be allowed to know what 
the challenges will be when he decides which xi’s to offer to the verifier. Hence, a 
solution is to require the verifier to commit to his challenges before what was step 
2 in Protocol 2, and to have him open his commitments afterwards. The intent is 
to force the challenges to be independent from the xi’s but still have the xi’s 
independent from the challenges. This leads to Protocol 3 below, which is almost 
the final solution. 
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Protocol 3. Cforcing the veri$er to commit) 
1: the prover and the verifier agree on p, (Y and k 
2: the verifier chooses s in Z,*; he sends s to the prover 
the verifier also chooses bits y, , y,, . . . , yk and commits to them 
3: the prover commits herself by sending x, , x2, . . . , xk to the verifier 
4: the verifier opens challenges y,, y2, . . . , yk for the prover 
5: the prover meets the challenges by sending z, , z2,. . . , zk to the verifier. 
Now, the verifier is faced with a tough choice if he wants to squeeze information 
from the prover: either he chooses s in step 2 such that he knows its discrete 
logarithm, or he does not (in fact, there are other more exotic strategies for the 
verifier, and they will be taken into account later). If he does, his commitments to 
Yl,Y2,..., Yk are bogus, which seems to make Protocol 3 no better than Protocol 
2 since the verifier can wait to see the Xi’s before having really to decide on his 
challenges. But that’s fine because Protocol 2 is perfect zero-knowledge in the case 
in which the verifier knows the key to the bit commitment scheme trap-door. 
Conversely, if the verifier chooses s in a way that he does not know its discrete 
logarithm, then his commitments to y, , y,, . . . , yk are genuine, so that they are 
independent from the Xi’s and the protocol is perfect zero-knowledge as well. In 
other words, the full title of this section should have been “Forcing the verifier to 
commit. . . either to his challenges or to the fact that he knows the key to the 
trap-door”. Either way we win! And indeed Protocol 3 is perfect zero-knowledge, 
as the enthusiastic reader may wish to prove. 
Unfortunately, Protocol 3 still does not work for a rather subtle reason: it is no 
longer a computationally convincing interactive protocol because the prover can 
cheat without ever needing to find the discrete logarithm of s! Although it is true 
that the prover is not capable of opening any of her blobs in more than one way 
(assuming she does not know and cannot compute the discrete logarithm of s), it 
is possible for her to create blobs that she cannot open at all at the time of their 
creation, but that she will be able to open later. When the verifier opens his own 
commitments at step 4, the prover will be able to open her blobs to show bits related 
to those that the verifier had committed to. As a simple example, assume that the 
verifier commits to some challenge y in step 2 by choosing a random r E Z,_, and 
computing e = (YES Y. After the verifier has given his commitment e to the prover, 
the prover can create a blob x by computing x = a4e for a randomly chosen q E Z,_, . 
Clearly, the prover cannot open this blob either way yet. Nevertheless, the verifier 
will reveal r to the prover in step 4, and this will enable the prover to “open” her 
blob x as bit y by showing “witness” q + r since x = ~Y’rsY (do not forget that q 
and r are members of Z,_, , hence the addition is done modulo p - 1). This ability 
of the prover to relate the value of some of her blobs to the challenges she will 
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subsequently be issued, spells doom on the protocol of [9]. Actually, this is not a 
problem with Protocol 3 itself (an observation due to Shafi Goldwasser). Rather, it 
points to the imperfection we have promised earlier about the discrete logarithm 
bit commitment scheme. It is nor enough for a bit commitment scheme to forbid 
the originator from opening a blob both ways. It must also be that the originator 
knows already which (unique) way she can open a blob, at the moment of its creation. 
In other words, the originator should not be allowed to “commit” to a bit that she 
does not yet have in mind. 
In order to solve this ultimate difficulty and obtain our final constant-round perfect 
zero-knowledge computationally convincing interactive protocol, we must force the 
prover to emit only blobs that she knows how to open at the time of their creation. 
Let x be a blob created by the prover. We say that it is a O-blob (resp. a l-blob) if 
the prover can exhibit a z such that x = LY’ (resp. x = (Y’S). As argued previously, 
no prover-created blob can be simultaneously a O-blob and a l-blob unless the 
prover knows (or can compute easily) the discrete logarithm of s. However, a blob 
can be neither a O-blob nor a l-blob if it was not created “according to the rules” 
by the prover. We call such blobs “EPR-blobs” by analogy with the way the 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen “paradox” of quantum physics [l] allows cheating the 
quantum coin-tossing protocol [5]. Again, the danger of EPR-blobs is that they 
could subsequently become either O-blobs or l-blobs when the prover obtains further 
information from the verifier (i.e. when the verifier opens his commitments to his 
challenges). 
The following blob certijcation subprotocol is inspired by Benaloh’s cryptographic 
capsules [3], and a similar idea was used in the perfect zero-knowledge statistically 
convincing interactive protocol for graph nonisomorphism due to Goldreich, Micali 
and Wigderson [25]. It allows the prover to convince the verifier that a given blob 
is not EPR, but does not reveal anything as to whether it is a O-blob or a l-blob. 
Let x be a non-EPR-blob, which we shall call the actual blob. Let c E (0, l} be such 
that x is a c-blob. Let z be the prover’s witness that would allow her to open this 
blob, i.e. x = (Y’s(‘. In order to convince the verifier that she can open blob x, the 
prover creates k additional control blobs u, , u2, . . . , uk by randomly selecting k bits 
b,,&,..., bk together with v,, v2,. . . , vk in Z,_,, and computing u, = cr”is’,, 
1 s is k. She gives all these control blobs to the verifier. At this point, the verifier 
selects k random challenges h,, h2,. . . , hl, E (0, l} and sends them to the prover. 
For each hi = 0, the prover opens control blob u, by showing bi and v,. For each 
h, = 1, the prover shows that she can open the actual blob x if and only if she can 
open control blob ui. This is done as follows: 
l if c = bi, the prover computes wi = v, -z and gives it to the verifier, who checks 
that u, = (Y ‘+‘sx; 
l if c # bi, the prover computes w, = v, + z and gives it to the verifier, who checks 
that nix = cx “‘1~. 
If in fact x is an EPR-blob, the only way the prover could fool the verifier in this 
blob certification subprotocol, would be to guess exactly the challenges h, , hz, . . . , hk 
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to come. This would allow her to prepare control blob ui “honestly” when h, = 0 
but otherwise to compute ui = (Y~~x if bi = 0 or Ui = (Y’“~sx-’ if bi = 1 for a randomly 
chosen wi E Z,_l. If any of the hi’s had been guessed incorrectly, the prover would 
either be caught unable to open control blob Ui (if in fact hi = 0) or unable to relate 
x to ui (if hi = 1). The probability of such successful guessing is 2-k. On the other 
hand, it is clear that the verifier learns nothing about c by learning either the value 
of bi when hi = 0 or whether or not c = bi when hi = 1. 
You may have noticed that this blob certification subprotocol is run in parallel: 
the prover gives all the control blobs to the verifier, and only then does the verifier 
give his string of challenges to the prover. This is precisely where the infernal circle 
is broken. Even better, any number of instances of the blob certification subprotocol 
can take place in parallel. Consider 1 actual blobs for which the prover wishes to 
convince the verifier that none of them is EPR. For this, she can provide k control 
blobs for each actual blob before requesting the whole batch of Ix k challenges 
from the verifier. A formal proof that the verifier learns nothing about the prover’s 
secret even when this process is run in parallel, will be implicit when we prove in 
Section 8 that our final protocol (Section 6), which uses the blob certification 
subprotocol, is perfect zero-knowledge. 
The final protocol is exactly like Protocol 3, except that the blob certification 
subprotocol is used between steps 3 and 4 for each and every blob that the prover 
had issued at step 3. In this way, it becomes impossible (except with probability 
2-k) that the information provided by the verifier at step 4 might help the prover 
cheat. We shall now proceed to describe the final protocol in detail, instead of the 
high-level abstraction used so far in Protocols l-3. Before this can be done, however, 
a review of the basic BCC-protocol is necessary [9]. Moreover, for the sake of 
self-containment, we also need to review the formal definitions of perfect zero- 
knowledge and of computationally convincing interactive protocols. 
5. Notation and definitions 
5.1. Interactive protocols 
The notion of interactive protocol was originally formalized by Goldwasser, Micali 
and Rackoff [26]. In this section, we review the definitions and modify them when 
necessary for our purpose. An interactive protocol takes place by the exchange of 
messages back and forth between two parties, known as the prover and the veri$er. 
The purpose of the protocol is for the prover to convince the verifier of the validity 
of a statement such as “Boolean expression q is satisfiable” or “graphs G and H 
are not isomorphic”, or “I know the factorization of large integer n”. 
The protocol’s specification prescribes the behaviour of the “honest” parties, but 
sometimes we must deal also with parties that deviate arbitrarily from their prescribed 
behaviour. Such dishonest parties are called cheaters. It is convenient to think of 
the prover and verifier (honest or cheating) as probabilistic algorithms. These 
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algorithms take turns at being active. One of them is active initially. Whenever 
it wishes, the active party can terminate the entire protocol, or activate the other 
party before going to sleep. When the latter situation occurs, the activating party 
usually passes a message to the activated party. Normally, it is the verifier that 
decides to terminate the protocol, in which case he also chooses whether to 
accept or reject. 
In the original definition of interactive protocols by Goldwasser, Micali and 
Rackoff [26], the verifier (honest or cheating) is restricted to being probabilistic 
polynomial time. In the context of perfect zero-knowledge (Section 5.2), which 
concerns us in this paper, we believe that this is unnecessarily restrictive. Hence, 
we impose no computational restrictions on cheating verifiers. Nevertheless, we ask 
that the honest verifier be efficient since otherwise the protocol would be of no 
practical value. On the other hand, the prover of [26] is assumed to have unlimited 
computing power. We cannot accommodate such powerful provers in the context 
of computationally convincing interactive protocols (see below). However, we do 
not require specifically that the prover be probabilistic polynomial time because 
this would be an asymptotic restriction, which may be totally irrelevant in real-life 
instances. Rather, we make the assumption that there is a specific instance of a 
computational task that the prover cannot perform while the protocol is in progress. 
More details are given below. 
To any given run of an interactive protocol, there corresponds a conJidence 
parameter k, agreed upon between the prover and the verifier. It must be the case 
that the expected time to carry out the protocol between the honest parties grows 
at worst linearly with the value of k. The interactive protocol is statistically complete 
if, whenever the prover is honest, the probability that the honest verifier will terminate 
and accept is at least 1 -2-k. It is perfectly (or unconditionally) complete 
if this probability is exactly 1, as is the case for most interactive protocols in the 
literature, including our own given in Section 6. Notice that we do not require that 
a dishonest verifier must accept with high probability when the prover is honest, 
because of course a very stubborn cheating verifier could reject no matter what 
happens. 
Let us now consider an arbitrary dishonest prover, who is trying to convince the 
verifier of a false statement. Of course, such a cheating prover is not required to 
follow her prescribed share of the protocol; she can do whatever she wants in her 
attempts to fool the verifier. Let us nevertheless assume the existence of a specific 
computational task that the prover cannot perform, except with negligible probability 
C, during the time necessary to carry out the interactive protocol. The protocol is 
computationally convincing (with respect to that assumption) if the probability that 
the honest verifier, when interacting with this cheating prover, will accept the prover’s 
claim is at most b+2Pk. In other words, the only way the cheating prover can 
succeed is either by being exponentially lucky (with probability 2-k), or by success- 
fully carrying out (with probability C) the computational task that we assumed her 
incapable of doing [13]. 
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It should be emphasized that the computational limitation imposed on the prover 
is concrete, rather than being asymptotic as if we had simply requested her to be a 
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. Even if P=NP, it may still be infeasible 
for the prover to extract a large enough discrete logarithm while the interactive 
protocol is in progress (except with negligible probability). 
Let us finally remark that most published work that deals with interactive protocols 
does not have this confidence parameter k. Rather, they insist that the probability 
of successful cheating should be bounded by a function of the size of the prover’s 
claim. We feel that this is inadequate because there is no direct link between the 
importance for the verifier of not being fooled and the size of the statement under 
consideration (except perhaps that if the statement is short enough, the verifier 
might be able to handle it without help from the prover). Moreover, using k larger 
than, say, 300 is a ridiculous waste of time, whereas instances of size larger than 
300 could be reasonable in practice. 
5.2. Perfect zero-knowledge 
The notion of (computational) zero-knowledge was also introduced by Goldwasser, 
Micali and Rackoff [26]. In this paper, we only deal with the simpler and stronger 
notion of perfect zero-knowledge, which was introduced by Goldreich, Micali and 
Wigderson [25]. 
Consider an interactive protocol between the prover and the verifier. Assume that 
the prover is honest, but let us consider a cheating verifier that can deviate arbitrarily 
from his prescribed behaviour. (In the context of [25], the verifier is restricted to 
being probabilistic polynomial time; we do not impose any such restrictions here.) 
Intuitively, the protocol is perfect zero-knowledge if, despite his potentially nasty 
behaviour, the verifier does not learn anything about the prover’s secret, except of 
course that the prover’s claim is valid. 
In order to formalize this notion, we must introduce the concepts of the verifier’s 
view and of the simulator [26]. The uiew of the verifier, when interacting with the 
honest prover, is defined as what he gets to see while the protocol is in progress, 
namely his own random coin fiips and the messages sent to him by the prover. Of 
course, this view is a random variable, which depends on the verifier’s and the 
prover’s coin flips. The honest prover together with an arbitrary verifier define a 
probability distribution on the verifier’s possible views. 
We say that this view can be simulated if there is another probabilistic algorithm, 
known as the simulator, that can output views with exactly the same probability 
distribution without ever talking to the prover, under the sole assumption that the 
prover is honest. Contrary to Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff, we insist that this 
simulator should not depend on the verifier under consideration, but we allow it 
access to and complete control over the verifier. By “complete control”, we mean 
that the simulator can run the verifier, making him believe that he is interacting 
with the prover. At any time during this interaction, the simulator can take snapshots 
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of the verifier or restore him to a previous state. Moreover, the simulator is given 
control over the coin flips of the verifier. 
It is clear that the verifier does not learn anything from the prover that the 
simulator (who never even communicates with the prover) could not tell him. 
Therefore, if the simulator is efficient, the prover does not disclose anything to the 
verifier that he could not have computed by himself. But what do we mean by an 
“efficient simulator” considering that we had not restricted the verifier to being 
efficient? The simulator is ejicient if the expected time it requires to output its 
simulated view is at most a (small) constant factor of the expected time that the 
real protocol between the honest prover and the verifier under consideration would 
have taken. In other words, the simulator is allowed to restore the verifier and run 
it a few times with different partial views, but the expected number of such reruns 
should be small. 
Finally, we say that an interactive protocol is perfect zero-knowledge if such an 
efficient simulator exists. 
5.3. An abstract description of the basic BCC-protocol 
Our constant-round perfect zero-knowledge computationally convincing interac- 
tive protocol for satisfiability is inspired by a specific protocol introduced in [9]. 
Describing this basic BCC-protocol in detail would take up too much space, but an 
abstract description of how it proceeds is sufficient to understand the new techniques 
and ideas. We suggest that you read this subsection even if you are familiar with 
[9], because it introduces new notation. 
When we write f: X + Y, it means not only that f is a function from X to Y, but 
that this function can be computed efficiently. As an abuse of notation, f will also 
serve to denote an efficient algorithm for this computation. When we writef: X s Y, 
it means that f is an efficient probabilistic algorithm that associates to each x E X 
a probability distribution f(x) over Y. When no confusion can arise, we also use 
f(x) to denote the probabilistic result of applying algorithm f to input x. 
Let 1 denote (0, 1) and r denote (0, 1, q }. Given any set X, the set of finite 
sequences of elements of X is denoted by X*. (The symbol * used in Zt should 
not be confused with the symbol * used in X*.) If 1 E X*, we denote its length by 
1x1 and its ith element by x[i]. For ZE I* and d E r*, we say that Z and d’ are 
compatible, denoted c’=: d, if /cl = Id 1 and if, for all i, 1 d id /cl, c[ i] = d [ i] whenever 
d[ i] f 0. You should think of 0 as representing an unopened bit commitment. We 
also define the function 0 : r + 2 by O(0) = 0, 0( 1) = 1, and O(0) = 0. This function 
is extended in the natural way to 0: r*+E*. 
For any integer n, let S,, denote the set of Boolean expressions on n variables 
and let d,, denote {true, false}“, the set of truth assignments to n variables. Let 9 
and & denote the infinite union of the S,,‘s and &,‘s, respectively. With each ?P E 9 
a finite set V,,, c Z* is associated in [9] of “scrambled circuits” (it is not important 
to understand the “meaning” of the elements of (e,, but if you are familiar with 
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[9], think of them as the bits appearing in a “Figure 3” [9, page 1621 in some 
predetermined order). Similarly, to each W E 9 corresponds a finite set ga, c r* of 
“partially opened circuits” (again, if you are familiar with [9], think of the bits of 
a “Figure 4” in some predetermined order, with unopened blobs represented by 
0). Given any !P E 9 and FE Z*, it is efficiently decidable whether or not ZE VZq. 
Similarly, given any W E 3 and d’ E T*, it is efficiently decidable whether or not 
d’ E ga,. Moreover, for any given !P E 9, all the elements of (e, and ga, are of the 
same length, which is denoted by 1(q). 
The key property that makes the basic BCC-protocol work is that, for any !P E 9, 
there exist c’ E (e, and d’ E gq such that c’ x d’ if and only if ?P is satisfiable. More 
precisely, there are four efficient algorithms: 
(1) a:%% Y?, 
(2) p:ssg, 
(3) y:8x(ex&+Bu{(I} and 
(4) 6:9xVxB+_!$u{(I}, 
such that 
(1) For all !P E 9, a(q) is uniformly distributed over gq 
(2) For all ?P E 9, p(V) is uniformly distributed over aa, 
(3) If a’ E &,, is a satisfying assignment for some P E s,, and if ZE V&,, then 
y( P, Z, a’) is an element of ?& compatible with E. (Otherwise, y( P, 2, a’) = 1.) 
Moreover, for any satisfiable P E 9 and any satisfying assignment a’ for 
P, y( W, u( !P), a’) is uniformly distributed over $&,, and 
(4) If !PEY,Zegq,dEga, andif FX 4 then 6( W, E, d) is a satisfying assign- 
ment for ?P. Otherwise, 6( !P, F, dt) = _L. 
Assume that the prover wishes to convince the verifier that she knows a satisfying 
assignment for some P E .!X The basic BCC-protocol consists of k independent 
rounds taken one after the other. Round i goes as follows: The prover computes 
pi = a(P) and she commits to each bit ci[j] by offering a corresponding blob x,[j] 
to the verifier. Then, the verifier issues a challenge yi E (0, 1). If the challenge is “O”, 
the prover opens xi[ j] for each j, in effect showing 2; in the clear; the verifier checks 
that Zi E VZW. If the challenge is “l”, the prover uses her secret satisfying assignment 
a’ to compute Ji = y( V, Zi, a’) and she opens only the xi[j]‘s corresponding to 
di[ j] # 0 (notice that in this case d<[j] = ci[j] because Zi X pi); the verifier checks 
that di E ‘&. In either case, if the verifier’s check fails, he stops the entire protocol 
and rejects. If none of the k checks fail, the verifier stops and accepts. 
This protocol is computationally convincing because the prover does not know 
in advance which challenge to expect in each round. Let Zi and & be the answers 
it would give to each challenge in round i. Assuming that the prover cannot cheat 
the blobs, Zi and & must be compatible. If Zi E ‘&, and dj E ga,, then 6( ‘P, E<, Ji) is 
a satisfying assignment for !P, hence ?P is satisfiable and furthermore the prover 
knows or can efficiently compute a satisfying assignment for it. On the other hand, 
if Zi & g7, or dz e Ba,, there is at least a 50% probability that the verifier will catch 
the prover cheating in this round. The probability of undetected cheating is thus 
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2-k for the entire protocol, still assuming that the prover cannot cheat the bit 
commitment scheme. 
On the other hand, this protocol is perfect zero-knowledge provided that the 
commitments to 0 are information-theoretically indistinguishable from commitments 
to 1 (which they are if we use the bit commitment scheme described earlier). In 
order to simulate one round of the protocol, the simulator flips a coin. If it comes 
up heads, the simulator generates c’= a( ‘lu), commits to each bit in 5 and asks the 
verifier for his challenge. If the challenge is 0, the simulator opens all the blobs; 
otherwise, it forgets about this unlucky event and tries again. If the coin comes up 
tails, the simulator generates d = p(p), sets c’= O(d), commits to each bit in c!, and 
asks the verifier for his challenge. If the challenge is 1, the simulator opens the 
blobs corresponding to d[j] # 0; otherwise, it forgets about this unlucky event and 
tries again. Because commitments to 0 and commitments to 1 are indistinguishable, 
the verifier’s challenge is independent from the simulator’s coin flip. Hence, the 
expected number of trials for the successful simulation of one round is 2. Therefore, 
the simulation is perfect and all k rounds can be simulated one after the other in 
about twice the time it would take to carry out the real protocol. 
6. The final protocol 
We are now ready to provide a formal description of the final constant-round 
perfect zero-knowledge computationally convincing interactive protocol for 
satisfiability. Because satisfiability is NP-complete, it follows immediately that such 
protocols are possible for all statements in NP. 
Recall that E denotes (0, l} and r denotes {0, 1, q !}. Let us denote by p(c) the 
pair (x, z) corresponding to a commitment to bit c, where x is the blob and z is the 
witness. More specifically, if the bit commitment scheme described in Section 3 is 
used with parameters p, (Y and s, then p : E 5 Zz x Z,_, and p(c) is obtained by 
choosing z uniformly at random within Z,_, and computing x = (Y’s(‘. This notation 
is extended in the natural way to p (c’) when FE E*. We also extend it to p (6) when 
d~r*,inwhichcaseP(d)=P(O(d)), meaning that d[ i] = 0 is treated (arbitrarily) 
as if it were d[i]=O. 
Similarly, let cp :Zz x Z,_, x r+ {true, false} be defined such that cp(x, z, c) = true 
if and only if either c = 0, or x = LY’s~, i.e. if and only if blob x is to remain unopened, 
or else z is a correct witness to the fact that x is a c-blob. This notation is also 
extended in the natural way to cp : (Zz)’ x (Z,_,)’ x r’+ {true, false} for any integer 
1, in which case cp(<, Z, c’) = true if and only if x[i] = az’ilsc[il for all i such that 
c[i]#O, 1GiCZ. 
Let ly be a satisfiable Boolean expression. Assume the prover knows a satisfying 
assignment a’ for ly. The following protocol is carried out. To avoid cluttering the 
protocol with trivial details, some obvious but necessary tests are not expliciGy 
shown. For instance, the prover should make sure at step Pl that s E Zz, because 
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otherwise the verifier would immediately obtain her secret if the prover were stupid 
enough to proceed with the protocol when s = 0. 
Protocol 4. (the final constant-round protocol) 
0: (Initialization.) The prover and verifier agree on a large prime p such that 
the factorization of p - 1 is known, a generator (Y of Zz, and a confidence 
parameter k. This step does not count towards the number of rounds because 
it can be done ahead of time and because p and (Y could even be in the 
public domain (chosen once and for all by an authority that needs not be 
trusted). 
Vl: (The verifier sets up the bit commitment scheme parameters and “commits” to 
his challenges.) The verifier selects s E Z$ and y’ E E k at random. He computes 
(2, ?) = /3( 9). He sends s and e’ to the prover. 
PI: ( The prover commits to her scrambled circuits and sends control blobs with each 
actual blob.) For each i, 1 s i G k, the prover computes 2, = a(p) and (ii, $) = 
p(zi). For each blob Xi[j], the prover chooses &E (0, l}” at random and 
computes (tl,j, z$) = /3(&,). She sends all the 2,‘s and G,,‘s to the verifier. 
(Think of xi[J] as an actual blob for the jth bit of the ith scrambled circuit, 
and of 3, as the collection of control blobs for x,[j].) 
V2: (The verifier challenges the actual blobs to make sure they are not EPR.) For 
each i and j, the verifier chooses h:, E (0, l}k at random. He sends the i$‘s to 
the prover. 
P2: (The prover shows that her actual blobs are not EPR.) For each i, j and m 
such that hJm] = 0, the prover sets wi,[m] = vJm] and t,,[m] = bJm]. For 
each i, j and m such that hJm] = 1, the prover computes wV[m] as vJm] - 
z,[j] and sets tJm] = 0 if c,[j] = b,[ m ] or she computes wii[ m] as vli[ m] + Zi[j] 
and sets tJm] = 1 if c,[j] # b,[m]. The prover sends all the Gti’s and Gj’s to 
the verifier. 
V3: (The verifier checks that the actual blobs were not EPR, in which case he opens 
his challenges.) For each i, j and m such that h,[ m] = 0, the verifier checks 
that cp( q,[m], wli[ m], t,-[ml). For each i, j and m such that h,[m] = 1, the 
verifier checks that uti[m] = a W’Jmlxi[ j] if tii[ m] = 0 or uli[ m]x,[j] = (Y “Jmls 
if tij[ m] = 1. If any of these checks fail, the verifier stops and rejects; otherwise, 
the verifier sends r’ and y’ to the prover. 
P3: (The prover checks that the challenges have been opened honestly and, if so, 
meets them.) The prover checks that cp(C, ?, 3). If this fails, the prover quits. 
Otherwise, for each i such that y[ i] = 0, the prover sends the verifier i; and 
zi. For each i such that y[i] = 1, the prover computes di = y( F, ?,, a-), she 
resets z,[j] to 0 when d,[j] = Cl, and she sends i: and $ to the verifier. 
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V4: (The verzjier checks that all is well.) For each i such that y[ i] = 0, the verifier 
checks that Zi E %p and that cp(x’,, si, &). For each i such that y[i] = 1, the 
verifier checks that d, E 9q and that cp(_?,, $, &). If any of these checks fail, 
the verifier stops and rejects; otherwise, he stops and accepts. 
7. The protocol is computationally convincing 
It is obvious that Protocol 4 is perfectly complete. Let us now argue that it is 
computationally convincing. Assume that the prover attempts running her share of 
Protocol 4 on a Boolean formula q that is not satisfiable. Assume furthermore that 
she is not capable, while the protocol is in progress, to figure out the discrete 
logarithm of s, as given to her by the verifier at step Vl. In this case, we claim that 
the probability that her cheating will go undetected is at best 2-k if she interacts 
with the honest verifier prescribed by Protocol 4. 
In order to see this, notice first that her behaviour in step Pl cannot depend on 
the verifier’s challenge vector y’ since the vector of commitments e’ is information- 
theoretically uncorrelated to the challenges. 
In step Pl, the prover can either output at least one EPR-blob x,[j], or all of the 
2,‘s are composed only of non-EPR-blobs. In the first case, as argued in Section 4, 
the probability that this will not be detected by the verifier at step V3 is 2pk at best. 
In the second case, there can exist at most one challenge vector y’ for which the 
prover can satisfy the verifier at step V4. This is because if there is an i such that 
the prover can satisfy the verifier both if y, = 0 (by giving F,) and if yi = 1 (by giving 
&), then 2, and C$ would have to be compatible by assumption that the prover 
cannot change her commitments and because they are not EPR. But then 6( q, 2, d) 
is a satisfying assignment for Yf, which contradicts the assumption that q is not 
satisfiable. Therefore, the probability that the challenge vector opened by the verifier 
at step V3 is precisely the one that the prover was able to cope with, is at most 2-k 
as well. 
Actually, a stronger result can be proved: even if q is satisfiable, the prover will 
be caught cheating with probability at least 1 -2-k unless she actually knows a 
satisfying assignment for q (or can compute one while the protocol is in progress), 
or unless she can extract the discrete logarithm of s. Therefore, this protocol 
constitutes a computationally convincing proof of knowledge. This issue is discussed 
at greater length in [13]. 
8. The protocol is perfect zero-knowledge 
The main theoem of this paper is that the constant-round protocol of Section 6 
is perfect zero-knowledge. In order to establish this, we must exhibit a simulator, 
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and prove that it is efficient and that it produces views with exactly the correct 
distribution. First of all, let us see the simulator. 
8.1. The simulator 
In order to simulate perfectly and efficiently the conversation that the real prover 
would have with any verifier, we must take account of a wide range of possible 
behaviours for the verifier. For instance, the simulator must succeed when 
(1) the verifier chooses s at step Vl in a way that he knows its discrete logarithm, 
which allows him to give bogus commitments also at step Vl and thus postpone 
his choice of challenges until step V3; or 
(2) the verifier chooses s at step Vl such that he does not know its discrete 
logarithm; or 
(3) more subtly, when the verifier chooses s in a way that he does not yet know 
its discrete logarithm at step Vl, but in some cases manages to figure it out before 
reaching step V3, perhaps using information provided by the prover in steps Pl and 
P2 (of course, such information could only help the verifier by sheer luck since the 
prover does not know the discrete logarithm of S; nevertheless, such luck is possible 
and must be taken into account); or 
(4) the verifier decides at some point to “misbehave”, that is to refuse to cooperate 
in a way that would cause the prover to terminate prematurely the protocol (this 
happens for instance if the verifier supplies s = 0 at step Vl, if he claims at step V3 
that the prover has cheated with the control blobs when in fact this is not the case, 
or if he supplies “2” as one of his challenges vi). 
In the first case, the verifier’s challenges could depend on the prover’s input at 
steps Pl and P2. If this happens, the simulator will use its resetting capability to 
force the verifier to disclose the discrete logarithm of s. Once the simulator knows 
this information, it can “cheat” when it simulates step P3 since this gives it the key 
to the bit commitment scheme trap-door. 
In the second case, the simulator can run the verifier once in order to obtain his 
challenges at step V3, rewind the verifier, and resimulate step Pl with commitments 
that it can open to meet the same challenges. 
The third and fourth cases are more difficult and will be dealt with by the simulator 
formally described below. In particular, the fourth case is initially dealt with when 
we prescribe that the simulator should “output the verifier’s view so far (including 
the random tape) and stop when the verifier refuses to behave properly”. 
In order to describe the simulator, it is more convenient to think of the verifier 
as if it were a deterministic process having access to a read-only one-way purely 
random tape. This random tape is put under the control of the simulator. Initially, 
this tape is empty. Whenever the verifier wishes to access a new bit on his random 
tape, the simulator flips a fair coin, places the resulting random bit on the tape, 
and allows the verifier to proceed. At any time it wishes, the simulator can take a 
snapshot of the verifier and later restore the verifier in the exact state it had then. 
When the verifier is reset to a previous state, his read-only head on the random tape 
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is reset to where it was in that state, but the other random bits that the simulator 
may have flipped remain there, possibly to be read again by the verifier. Hence, the 
verifier reuses the same source of random bits after resetting. The advantage of this 
approach instead of having the simulator prepare the random tape once and for all 
ahead of time is that it allows to deal with verifiers that do not have an a priori time 
limit. This is important if we want the simulator to work with any verifier whatsoever. 
Moreover, it is crucial even if we only consider probabilistic verifiers that run in 
expected polynomial time but that could take significantly more time with small 
probability. 
We now proceed to describe the simulator. When we mention step 0, step Vi or 
step Pi, we refer to the corresponding steps in Protocol 4. You will notice that the 
simulation follows exactly Protocol 4 up to and including step S6 (with the simulator 
in the role of the prover). 
Protocol 5. (the simulator) 
SO: The simulator carries out the initialization step 0 with the verifier exactly 
as the prover would. If the verifier refuses to behave properly, the simulator 
outputs the verifier’s view so far (including the random tape) and stops. 
Sl: The simulator waits for the verifier to supply s and e’ as expected in step 
Vl. If the verifier refuses to behave properly, the simulator outputs the 
verifier’s view so far and stops. Otherwise, the simulator takes a snapshot 
of the verifier. 
S2: The simulator proceeds exactly as the prover would in step Pl; in particular, 
it sends the &‘s and u’,‘s to the verifier. 
S3: The simulator waits for the verifier to supply the &,‘s as expected in step 
V2. If the verifier refuses to behave properly, the simulator outputs the 
verifier’s view so far and stops. 
S4: The simulator proceeds exactly as the prover would in step P2; in particular, 
it sends the 6,‘s and the cj’s to the verifier. 
S5: The simulator waits for the verifier to supply r’ and y’ as expected in step 
V3. If the verifier refuses to behave properly, the simulator outputs the 
verifier’s view so far and stops. 
S6: The simulator checks that cp(Z, ?, 9). If this fails, the simulator outputs the 
verifier’s view so far and stops. Otherwise, the simulator saves r’ and j into 
i and j for future use. 
S7: (This is the turning point in the simulation.) The simulator restores the verifier 
to its state immediately after step Sl. 
S8: (The simulator sends commitments that it can open but only if challenges y^ 
are asked again.) For each i such that $i = 0, the simulator computes 
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Zi =o(!Jf) and (&, Z,) =p(&). For each i such that $ = 1, the simulator 
computes Ji = p( p) and ($, si) = /?($). After this, the simulator proceeds 
exactly as the prover would have at step Pl: for each blob x,[ j], the simulator 
chooses &E (0, l}k at random and computes ( Glj, i;,) = /3( &). It sends all 
the &‘s and u’,‘s to the verifier. 
S9: The simulator waits for the verifier to supply the s’s as expected in step 
V2. If the verifier refuses to behave properly, the simulator goes back to 
step S7. 
SlO: The simulator proceeds as the prover would in step P2, except that whenever 
fi = 1, c,[j] should be replaced by O(d,[j]); in particular, it sends the GU’s 
and the Gi’s to the verifier. 
Sll: The simulator waits for the verifier to supply r’ and y’ as expected in step 
V3. It is possible that this response from the verifier will be different from 
what he had given previously at step S5. If the verifier refuses to behave 
properly, the simulator goes back to step S7. 
S12: The simulator checks that cp(Z, ?, 9). If this fails, the simulator goes back to 
step S7. 
S13: There are two possibilities at this point: either y’= j, or not. In the first case, 
the simulator had prepared its commitments so that it can meet the chal- 
lenges. In the second case, this means that the verifier has changed his 
challenges, which allows the simulator to compute the discrete logarithm 
of s. If y’= $, go to step S15; otherwise, continue. 
S14: ( The verljier has changed his chal1enge.s between steps S.5 and Sll.) Consider 
any i, 1 G i < k, such that yi # 9,. The simulator computes a = r, - ci if yi = 0, 
or a = t, - r, if y, = 1 (once again, do not forget that this subtraction is done 
in Z,_, , hence modulo p - 1). Because (Y’~sI’, = ei = CY~S~,, it is clear that 
(Y a = s, hence the simulator has obtained the discrete logarithm of s. 
For each i such that y, = 0 and fi = 1, the simulator computes Zi = u(p), 
and for each i such that yi = 1 and y^X = 0, the simulator computes di = p( q). 
Now, for each i such that yi # ii, the simulator changes the zi[j]‘s chosen 
in step S8 when necessary, as explained below. This will allow the simulator 
to open the “commitments” contained in 1, in a way that will satisfy challenge 
yi even though Ii was originally prepared in order to satisfy challenge Fi. 
This is done as follows. For each i such that yi # 9; and for each j such that 
ci[jl f 0(4M), 
l if Fi = c,[j], the value of z,[j] is decremented by a; 
l if 3i f c,[j], the value of z,[j] is incremented by a. 
SE: (The simulator is now ready to output the verijer’s view.) The simulator 
outputs the verifier’s random tape, the gj’s and the u’,‘s from step S8, and 
the GG’s and the 4,‘s from step SlO. Moreover, for each i such that y[i] = 0, 
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the simulator outputs Si and Z, ; for each i such that y[i] = 1, the simulator 
resets z,[ j] to 0 when di[ j] = 0, and it outputs 5; and &. The simulator halts. 
8.2. The simulator produces the correct distribution 
Let 1z’ be a satisfiable Boolean expression. Let a’ be a satisfying assignment for 
Iv known by the honest prover. Let 1 denote I( VI), the length of each member of 
+Zq and $I&,. Consider any verifier. Consider also an infinite string R of random 
bits. From now on, consider W, Z, 1, R, and the verifier as fixed. Hence, when we 
say that “A is determined uniquely by B”, we mean “by B and these fixed 
parameters”. 
Let us analyze the view of the verifier supplied with R on his random tape when 
interacting with the honest prover prescribed by Protocol 4, and compare it with 
the view produced by the simulator when it supplies the appropriate initial segment 
of the same R to the verifier on his random tape. For simplicity, let us assume that 
the verifier does not misbehave so early that step Pl is not even entered; otherwise, 
it is obvious that the simulation is perfect. For simplicity, we shall also pretend that 
step 0 in Protocol 4 and step SO in Protocol 5 do not exist, because it is clear that 
step SO simulates exactly step 0. 
Now that we have excluded step 0 from consideration, observe that the verifier’s 
s and e’ supplied at step Vl are determined by the fixed parameters, and thus may 
as well be considered fixed too. Observe also that the only step of Protocol 4 in 
which the prover makes random choices is step Pl. Hence, everything in Protocol 
4 is determined entirely by the prover’s choices of the Z,‘s, ii’s, Kj’s, and 4’s. (The 
2,‘s and z?,~‘s are determined from these random choices.) 
More to the point, the verifier’s view of Protocol 4 until just before step P3, when 
interacting with the prover, is determined entirely by the $‘s, Gil’s, and f:!‘s supplied 
by the prover at steps Pl and P2 (unless step P2 does not take place, in which case 
the verifier’s view is determined by the ii’s and r&‘s alone). This is true because the 
d,-‘s supplied by the honest prover at step P2 (assuming it takes place) are determined 
uniquely by the $‘s, u’,‘s, cj’s, and by the IYir’s supplied by the verifier at step V2, 
but the &,‘s themselves are determined uniquely by the ,-&‘s and the r&‘s. To see 
this, notice that the tests performed by the honest verifier at step V3 give no freedom 
for the G,,‘s that will not cause him to reject, because the discrete logarithm is 
uniquely defined. 
A crucial observation is that the prover’s protocol results in each xi[ j], ug[m] 
and tlj[m] being produced randomly and independently according to the uniform 
distribution over Zjf , Zz, and (0, l}, respectively (except that the cj’s are not 
produced when step P2 is not entered). Let A denote the space of possible values 
for the collection of x’,‘s, u’,‘s, and cj’s. More precisely, A = (Zf x (Z,* x (0, l})k)‘k. 
Consider any element h E A. We say that A is good if Protocol 4 reaches step V4 
when the verifier is supplied the view consistent with A at steps Pl and P2. Otherwise, 
h is bad. (“Consistent” means that the d,j’s take the unique values that would not 
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cause the honest verifier to reject at step V3). Finally, let 4 denote the number of 
good elements in A divided by the total number of elements in A. In simple terms, 
C stands for the probability that the verifier does not misbehave in Protocol 4, the 
probability being taken over the random choices of the prover (we do not care if 
the verifier misbehaves in step V4 by rejecting when he should not, because this 
decision is not part of his view). Of course, p may be a function of the random 
tape R, but this does not concern us here since R is fixed. 
The interaction of the verifier with the honest prover in Protocol 4 is characterized 
as follows: The prover chooses the Zi’s, Ti’s, &‘s, and $‘s randomly at step Pl. This 
determines the Zi’s and $‘s. If the verifier misbehaves at step V2, consider random 
binary values for the cj’s; otherwise, the prover’s $‘s and 6,‘s determine the verifier’s 
Gq’s, which in turn determine the prover’s cj’s at step P2. Let A stand for the 
collection of Zi’s, Gtij’s, and t:I’.s thus produced. Once again, A is uniformly distributed 
over A by the prover’s random choices at step Pl. 
If A is good, which happens with probability &, it determines the verifier’s challenge 
vector y’ at step V3. At step P3, the prover shows the verifier Zi’s in %?* when yi = 0 
and &‘s in 9, when y, = 1, together with the appropriate &‘s. Even though the Zi’s 
and &‘s were determined as early as step Pl, they are completely uncorrelated with 
A because blobs are uncorrelated with the bits they hide. Moreover, the &‘s are 
uniformly distributed over Ce, (because they are produced by a call on U(T) at 
step Pl), and the 2,‘s are uniformly distributed over ga, (because they are produced 
as y( p, a(p), a’) in steps Pl and P3). Quite the opposite, the &‘s are determined 
completely by A, the &‘s (when hi = 0) and the &‘s (when hi = 1). 
In conclusion, the verifier’s view of Protocol 4 is uniquely determined by a random 
A uniformly distributed over A and, if A is good, by a collection of random &‘s 
and &‘s uniformly distributed over %q and ga,, respectively. 
Let us now consider the view produced by the simulator in Protocol 5 when it 
supplies the verifier with the appropriate initial segment of the same random tape 
R. Clearly, Protocol 5 mimics exactly Protocol 4 until (and if) it reaches step S7. 
Therefore, with probability 1 - &., the simulation never reaches step S7 and it outputs 
the view of a verifier that misbehaves. This view is produced according to the same 
probability distribution as if the verifier had interacted with the prover. Moreover, 
this view is consistent with a A E A that is not good, and this A is obtained according 
to the uniform distribution over the bad elements of A (assuming that c # 1). 
On the other hand, the simulation reaches step S7 with probability C. This happens 
if and only if the view of the verifier so far is consistent with a good A E A, in which 
case this A is distributed uniformly over the good elements in A. Each attempt to 
go from step S7 to step S13 can be thought of as sampling within A uniformly in 
the hope of hitting a good element again. Clearly, whenever such a good element 
A is reached, it is obtained according to the uniform distribution over the good 
elements of A. 
From there, step S15 will produce Zi’s in % yl when the verifier’s challenge yi is 0 
and &‘s in Godly when yi is 1, together with the unique 2,‘s consistent with the &‘s 
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in A. Regardless of whether these Fj’s and &‘s were chosen at step S8 or S14, they 
are uniformly distributed over %‘F (by a call on a(V)) and ga, (by a call on p(V)) 
in a way that is uncorrelated with A. 
To summarize, the view produced by the simulator is consistent with a random 
A uniformly distributed over the bad elements of A with probability 1 -C, or with 
a random A uniformly distributed over the good elements of A with probability C. 
This is just a complicated way of saying that the view produced by the simulator 
is consistent with a random A uniformly distributed over all the elenents of A. 
Moreover, if A is good, this view includes random Zi’s and &Is (as required by the 
hi’s being consistent with A) uniformly distributed over %, and 9,, together with 
the appropriate Zi’s. In other words, the view produced by the simulator is distributed 
exactly as the verifier’s view when interacting with the honest prover. The two key 
properties of the basic BCC-protocol that make all this work are that both p(p) 
and y( V, a(F), a’) produce elements of 9 ly according to the same probability 
distribution, and that blobs are information-theoretically uncorrelated with the bits 
they hide. This concludes the proof that the simulation is perfect. 
8.3. The simulator is eficient 
Let & and A be as in Section 8.2, as well as all the fixed parameters. Clearly, 4 
is exactly the probability that the simulator reaches step S7 in Protocol 5 because 
until then Protocol 5 mimics precisely Protocol 4. More interestingly, C is also 
exactly the probability that the simulator, if in step S7, can reach step S13 (and 
hence terminate happily at step Sl5) without going back at least once to step S7. 
In order to see this, observe again that the collection of Zi’s, ii,‘s, and cj’s obtained 
in steps S8 and SlO is produced randomly according to the uniform distribution 
over A. 
Consequently, a simple calculation shows that the expected number of times that 
step S7 is entered is exactly 1 (unless c = 0, in which case this number is 0). But it 
is clear that steps SO to S6 cannot be entered more than once each, and that none 
of the steps after S7 can be entered more times than step S7 itself. Therefore, the 
expected time for the simulator’s protocol is no more than the expected time for 
executing once each of its steps, which is efficient with respect to the verifier’s 
efficiency. 
This completes the proof that Protocol 4 is perfect zero-knowledge. 
9. One-way certified group actions 
Our final protocol, as given in Section 6, is computationally convincing under the 
certified discrete logarithm assumption (Section 3). Clearly, a weaker assumption 
is sufficient to make it work: all we need is a trap-door bit commitment scheme 
unconditionally secure for the originator, such that EPR-blobs can be detected 
except possibly with exponentially small probability. 
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It would be very nice if such bit commitment schemes could be designed under 
the sole assumption that one-way functions exist. Although we are not able to do 
this, we now proceed to show that it is sufficient to assume the existence of one-way 
certified group actions. This is a generalization of the one-way group homomorphism 
introduced in [27] and used in a previous version of the current paper [14]. For 
the sake of self-containment, we review here this notion from [15]. 
9.1. DeJinitions 
First of all, let us recall what a group action is. Let G be a finite group whose 
operation is simply denoted by juxtaposition and let E denote the identity element 
of G. Let S be any finite set. We say that G acts on S if each element of G induces 
a permutation of S such that the permutation induced by gh is the composition of 
the permutations induced by g and by h, where g and h are any elements of G. 
More formally, we have a function T: G + (S + S) such that 
(1) (vg E G)(Vh E G)(Vs E S)[(T(gh))(s) = (Tk))((T(h))(s))l, and 
(2) (Vg E G)(Vt E S)(3!s E S)[( T(g))(s) = t]. (It is an easy exercise to show that 
this unique s is (T(g-‘))( t).) 
Given condition (l), it is elementary to prove that condition (2) is equivalent to 
saying that the function induced by the group identity element is the identity function. 
In other words, G acts on S through T if and only if conditions (1) above and (3) 
below are satisfied. 
(3) (vs E S)[(T(&))(s) = ~1. 
To avoid cluttering the text with parentheses, it is customary to denote (T(g))(s) 
simply by gs. Therefore, condition (1) can be restated simply as (gh)s = g(hs). 
(Despite the appearance of this formula, it does not really have anything to do with 
associativity!) 
Let us now suppose that G acts on S. Let sO be a fixed element of S. The group 
action is s,-one-way if: 
l Membership in G and S can be tested efficiently; 
l It is feasible to draw randomly within G with uniform distribution. By g Ed G, 
we mean that g is chosen randomly within G with uniform distribution; 
l The group operation, the group inversion, and the group action can be computed 
efficiently. In other words, given any g E G, h E G and s E S, it is easy to compute 
gh, g-l, and gs; 
l Consider g E R G and let t = gs,. Given sO and t, it is infeasible to compute any 
g such that &= t, except with negligible probability, where the probability is 
taken over all choices of g and possibly over the random choices taken by the 
efficient algorithm trying to defeat this property. Note that the problem is not to 
find g#g. 
A group action is one-way if it is feasible to find an sO E S such that the group action 
is s,-one-way. Such an sO will be referred to as the source of the action. Given any 
s E S, let Q(s) denote the orbit {t E S I(3g E G)[ t = gs]}. A one-way group action 
whose source is s,, is certified if: 
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l Given any t E S, it is easy to decide whether or not t E Q(sO). Of course, the easy 
thing is to decide on the existence of a g E G such that t = gs,, not to actually 
discover any such g. 
9.2. Commitments with group actions 
Let G be a group and S be a set, and consider a one-way certified group action. 
l In order to set up a bit commitment scheme, the receiver chooses a source s0 for 
the action and a g, E, G. He computes s, = g,s, and he gives s0 and s, to the 
originator. The originator checks that s0 E S, s, E S, and s, E Q(s,). 
l In order to commit to bit x E (0, l}, the originator chooses g E R G and computes 
b = gs,. She keeps g as her witness to the effect that b is an x-blob. 
l In order to open a commitment b as bit x, the originator shows the corresponding 
witness g. The receiver checks that b = gs,. 
Notice that O-blobs are produced by computing gs, whereas 1 -blobs are produced 
by computing gsl = g(g& = (g&so, where g Ed G. Therefore, such commitments 
are information-theoretically secure for the originator because the effect of comput- 
ing gg, for a fixed g, E G and a g chosen randomly with uniform distribution within 
G is in fact to choose randomly an element of G with uniform distribution. In other 
words, nothing distinguishes a O-blob from a l-blob, except for the witness known 
by the originator alone. The condition that the one-way group action should be 
certified is crucial here: if the receiver were able to get away with giving the originator 
some s, g Q(s,), the set of O-blobs would be disjoint from the set of l-blobs! 
Nevertheless, it is shown in [15] that a one-way group action that is not certified, 
can still be used to implement a bit comment scheme sufficiently secure to obtain 
a bounded-round computationally convincing statistical zero-knowledge interactive 
protocol for any NP statement. 
On the other hand, assume for a contradiction that the originator is able to open 
a given blob b both as a O-blob and as a l-blob. In order to do this, she must know 
x0 and x, in G such that b = xisi. But then x~‘xOsO = x;‘x,s, = s,. If the originator 
-1 computes g = x1 x0, she will have found a g E G such that gs, = s, , which is precisely 
what was assumed to be infeasible by the one-wayness of the action. 
9.3. How to use such commitments 
Bit commitment schemes based on one-way certified group actions can be used 
directly in the basic BCC-protocol. However, there is a technical difficulty if you 
want to use them in the constant-round protocol given in Section 6: there is no 
obvious way to implement control blobs as described in Section 4 in order to defeat 
the EPR threat! 
Fortunately, Benaloh’s original cryptographic capsules [3] can be used instead 
of control blobs at the cost of only doubling the number of blobs involved in the 
protocol. This is possible because bit commitment schemes based on one-way 
certified group actions allow the originator of two blobs b, and b2 to convince the 
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receiver that they are commitments to the same bit (unless they are both EPR) if 
in fact this is so. In order to do so, let x E (0, 1) and let g, and g, be the originator’s 
witnesses for blobs 6, and b2, respectively. If the originator provides the receiver 
with h = g,g;‘, the receiver can check that hb, = bZ. 
We leave it for the reader to verify that the only way the originator can provide 
an h E G that transforms b, into b2 is if she can open both blobs to show the same 
bit, unless both blobs are EPR. We also leave it for the reader to verify that no 
information about which way both these blobs can be opened leaks when the 
originator gives h to the receiver. (The reason why control blobs cannot be imple- 
mented directly with one-way certified group actions is that they do not provide a 
natural mechanism by which the originator can convince the receiver that he can 
open blobs 6, and b, to show d#erent bits, assuming they are not EPR.) 
9.4. Examples of one-way certijied group actions 
9.4.1. Back to the discrete logarithm 
Assuming the certified discrete logarithm assumption, a one-way certified group 
action can be built as follows. Let p be a prime for which the factorization of p - 1 
is known and let (Y be a generator for Zz. Let G be Z,_, , let S be Zz, and let s,, 
be 1. Given g E G and s E S, the group action is defined as gs = sag. It is easy to 
see that all the requirements for a one-way certified group action are satisfied. In 
this case, the one-wayness of the group action follows directly from the certified 
discrete logarithm assumption and the one-way group action is certified because 
recognizing elements of Q(Q) is trivial since S = Q(Q) follows from the fact that 
(Y is a certified generator. 
9.42. One-way group homomorphisms 
Consider any one-way group homomorphism h : X + Y (see [ 14, Section 51 for 
a definition) such that membership in X and Y can be tested efficiently (an important 
condition forgotten in [14]). Let G be X, S be Y, and s,, be the identity element 
of Y. Given g E G and s E S, the group action is defined as gs = s * h(g). Details 
that this defines a one-way certified group action are left for the reader. 
9.4.3. Scheme based on graph isomorphism 
The notion of one-way group homomorphisms described in [14] provided a 
generalization of the bit commitment scheme based on the certified discrete logarithm 
assumption, but it was probably not as general as one-way certified group actions. 
Although we do not know any one-way certi$ed group action that could not be 
recast in the context of one-way group homomorphisms, we now describe a one-way 
group action that does not correspond to a one-way group homomorphism. The 
one-wayness of our group action depends on an unproved assumption introduced 
in [ 111. Unfortunately, this group action does not appear to be certified. 
Let n be a fixed large integer. Let G be the group of permutations of X,, = 
{l,%..., n} under composition (where (gh)(i) = h(g(i))). Let S be the set of all 
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graphs with X,, as vertex set. Let us assume the existence of a hard graph in the 
sense of [ 111: a graph is hard if it is infeasible to figure out an isomorphism between 
it and a random isomorphic copy of it, except with negligible probability. Let s0 E S 
be such a hard graph. Given g E G and s = (X,,, E) E S, the group action is defined 
as gs = (X,,, 8), where (u, u) E l? if and only if (g(u), g(v)) E E. This group action 
is one-way by assumption. Intuitively, the reason why this group action cannot be 
recast as a group homomorphism is that there is no natural group operation that 
one could put on S. 
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